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From Consistency to Coherence




1 What  pragmatism is,  whether  it  refers  to  a  philosophical  method,  a  specific  theory,
cultural  politics,  a  literary theory or  a  mixture of  all  of  these,  has  been part  of  the
controversy surrounding pragmatism from its very beginning. Accordingly, there seem to
be as many names for the movement as there are thinkers, which becomes most explicitly
manifest  in  Peirce’s  famous  abandonment  of  the  term  “pragmatism”  in  favour  of
“pragmaticism.”  The  genealogy  of  pragmatism,  however,  has  hardly  ever  been
questioned. The classical period or first generation of pragmatism consists of Charles
Sanders Peirce, William James, John Dewey, Ferdinand C. S. Schiller and, on its legal and
sociological  side,  Oliver  Wendell  Holmes  and  George  Herbert  Mead.  Contemporary
pragmatism or the second generation comprises at least three major strands which can
be  subsumed  under  the  headings  of  cultural  pragmatism,  analytic  pragmatism  and
continental pragmatism. Pragmatism as cultural politics is usually regarded to revolve
around Richard Rorty, while prominent representatives of analytic pragmatism include
Willard Van Orman Quine, Hilary Putnam, and Nicholas Rescher. Although less commonly
used,  the denomination of  continental  pragmatism is often employed to refer to the
writings of Karl-Otto Apel and Juergen Habermas. But not-withstanding the fact that the
list of canonical neo-pragmatists has grown extensively, there is widespread agreement
as  to  who falls  within  the  pragmatist  tradition and who does  not.  One  of  the  most
significant thinkers in the wake of William James, however, whose work can and must be
regarded  as a  major  contribution  to  pragmatist  thinking,  has  so  far  been  unduly
neglected. Although Alfred North Whitehead is not counted among the pragmatists, his
work not only helps to bridge the gap between American and European philosophy, but at
the same time links classical pragmatism with its contemporary, more analytic versions.
This development can best be illustrated by reference to the respective methodologies
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and  theories  of  truth.  James,  I  shall  argue,  advances  a  specific  form  of  epistemic
conservatism  which  modifies  the  pragmatic  concept  of  a  proposition’s  or  theory’s
applicability in order to avoid a separation of experience into isolated, discontinuous
fields  of  knowledge.  The Jamesian theory of  knowledge comprises  both an empirical
dimension that gets manifest in the notion of an idea’s “cash-value,”1 and a rational or
subjective dimension succinctly expressed in the notion of “consistency.”2 This twofold
conception is spelled out and elaborated on in Whitehead’s most systematic philosophical
work Process and Reality. Profoundly influenced by James’ philosophy, Whitehead’s project
of  devising a  speculative cosmology based on a  pragmatic  methodology introduces  a
number  of  criteria  that  allow  him  to  offer  a  more  refined,  systematic  theory  of
knowledge.  Most  significantly,  the  criterion  of  consistency  is  replaced  by  that  of
coherence  and  supplemented  by  the  demand  for  logic  in  order  to  ensure  a
comprehensive, unified theory. Although limited in scope to a metaphysical description
of  the world,  this  form of  speculative pragmatism avoids the common charges often
levelled against James.
2 Whitehead, I will argue in this paper, is methodologically a pragmatist in the Jamesian
sense  of  the  term.  A  re-assessment  of  his  philosophy  with  particular  focus  on  its
pragmatic methodology requires us to elaborate the intriguing relationship between the
two thinkers. Hence, in a first step I will  follow some of the various traces of James’
thought in Whitehead’s oeuvre to allow for an estimate of the degree of James’ influence.
Despite the fact that Whitehead’s perspective on the history of philosophy poses a serious
challenge to interpreters and almost makes impossible a clear account of how far his
thought falls within a certain tradition, there is evidence to suggest that James played a
major role in his philosophical development. In fact Whitehead’s appreciation of James
does not only concern the critique of consciousness as a substance and the turn towards a
functionalist  psychology,  but  also,  on  a  much  more  fundamental  level,  James’
methodology. Hence, I will in a second step reconstruct the Jamesian understanding of
pragmatism as both a method and a theory of truth with particular focus on the concept
of consistency. On this basis it will then be possible to outline the Whiteheadian approach
and  to  re-assess  his  place  with  the  philosophical  tradition,  before  pointing  out  the
differences between the two conceptions by dint of the aspect of religious experience.
Finally,  I  will  give  an  outlook  as  to  the  development  of  pragmatism from James  to
contemporary trends via Whitehead as a linking figure.
 
II. James, Whitehead and the American Renaissance
3 For every philosopher it is possible to find another one who praises him as a genius, a
trailblazer and precursor of his own thinking. In some cases, however, this admiration
comes somewhat as a surprise, because the respective types of thought seem to differ
more than they seem to agree. This is particularly so with the philosophies of William
James and Alfred North Whitehead. The former is known as a public intellectual, skeptical
about logic as a reliable tool of metaphysical enquiry, his writings vividly concrete and
sometimes almost as intimate as a confession. The latter, on the contrary, is renowned for
being a brilliant mathematician who spent a decade trying to rebuild the foundations of
logic  and whose  major  work is  a  masterpiece  of  complex abstractions.  Hence,  when
Whitehead attributes to James “the inauguration of  a  new stage in philosophy”3 and
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stylizes him as the central figure in the foundation of the American Renaissance,4 some
elaboration and clarification is required.
4 James had died in 1910, fourteen years before Whitehead’s arrival in New England. It is
highly probable that Whitehead had already taken to perusing James’ works while still
being a professor of mathematics in London and that he was familiar with pragmatist
thinking prior  to  settling in  his  adopted country.  As  early  as  in  1898,  when he was
working on his Treatise on Universal Algebra, he mentioned the contributions to logic and
symbolization made by Peirce, whom he would later name in one breath with James. The
first explicit reference to James dates back to 1910, when the reader of Whitehead’s entry
on  “Mathematics”  in  the  Encyclopedia  Britannica  is  referred  to  James’  Pragmatism  for
further reading on the question of “the one and the many.”5 Beginning with his transition
to  Harvard  in  1924  –  “the  university  of  William  James”6 –  the  American  becomes
omnipresent in his writings. Considering the fact that Whitehead took up his enormously
productive  philosophical  task  almost  immediately  after  his  arrival,  it  is  difficult  to
imagine that he should not have been well acquainted with James’ philosophy by the time
he started teaching and writing on philosophy. This is supported by Whitehead’s habit of
ranking James as a matter of course among the philosophical classics, together with Plato,
Aristotle, Leibniz7 or Hume.8 James’ oeuvre appears to have assumed a constant presence
in Whitehead’s thought, so that a quotation must “of course”9 be borrowed from William
James.
5 One of the most significant passages for Whitehead’s deep appreciation of James stands
out in a letter written to Charles Hartshorne in 1936. Whitehead refers to Charles Peirce
and William James as “the effective founders of the American Renaissance,”10 while at the
same time comparing Peirce to Aristotle and James to Plato. Certainly a comparison to
Plato is “the highest possible Whiteheadian praise.”11 But at the same time the reversal of
the actual chronology stresses a central aspect of Whitehead’s own philosophical credo:
The close link to the logic of science in Peirce’s pragmatism is seen as an analogy to
Aristotle’s systematization and limitation of Plato’s wide range of thinking. Hence, the
analogy is not simply a form of praise and approval, but indicates Whitehead’s preference
for the Jamesian approach that transcends the positivistic boundaries of scientifically
analyzable phenomena.  This is  not least obvious in the continuation and criticism of
James’ Varieties of Religious Experience in his own study Religion in the Making, which reveals
Whitehead as a close and attentive reader of James, whose non-sensualistic concept of
experience he embraces. Next to William James, Whitehead is one of the first thinkers of
the 20th century to approach religion by way of an appreciation of its factual givenness as
an existential and cultural phenomenon.
6 Although the two never met personally, the lasting impact of James’s work on Whitehead
is  one  of  the  most  fascinating  and challenging  in  20th  century  philosophy.  Craig  R.
Eisendrath was one of the first to come to the conclusion that Whitehead spells out the
systematic account James himself never produced.12 More recently, Michel Weber13 and
Scott Sinclair14 have elaborated on the relation between James and Whitehead, shedding
light  on  common  motifs  and  shared  approaches  to  the  concepts  of  time,  feeling,
consciousness and religion. Thus, it is all the more surprising that the “developmental
relation to pragmatism”15 in Whitehead has not yet been made the object of a detailed
study. His pragmatic background is already tangible in some of the early essays published
as  The  Aims  of  Education  in  1929,  where  he  develops  a  pragmatist  approach  to
epistemology  and  even  semantics16 which  to  a  certain  extent  anticipates  the  more
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elaborate findings of the late Wittgenstein. Although he does not explicitly engage in the
discourse on classical  pragmatist conceptions,  the notion of pragmatism continuously
reappears  in  all  his  major  writings.  With  regard  to science,  religion and philosophy
Whitehead  appeals  to  the  “pragmatic  test,”  concluding  in  the  identification  of
pragmatism and that “self-evidence, which sustains itself in civilized experience,”17 thus
putting philosophy as a whole on a pragmatic basis. In the present paper I will restrict
myself  to  Whitehead’s  contribution  to  pragmatism  in  the  context  of  philosophical
cosmology, mainly focusing on his magnum opus Process and Reality.
 
III. Consistency and James’ Theory of Truth
7 James defines pragmatism as both a philosophical method and a theory of truth,18 and
both aspects overlap and support each other. Taking up Peirce’s idea to bridge the gap
between res and intellectus through human action, James refuses to regard truth as the
stagnant isomorphic relation Rorty has referred to as a mirror  of  nature.  A notion or
concept does not require a trans-empirical quality to be able to direct us to experiential
reality. Within a radically empiricist world ontologically only definable as experience, the
criteria for a concept’s truth value must itself be experiential, i.e. the core of a true idea is
its function of successful guidance.
8 Truth  must  not  be  isolated  from  actual  experience,  and  all  instances  of  hypothetic
scientific truth ultimately rest on particular practical experience in the widest sense of
the term. For James, truth is a gradual concept, whose cash-value depends on how well it
serves to guide us to new experiences. It is, moreover, a processual concept, since the
truth of a proposition is not a definite quality to be revealed in the course of its practical
application, but refers to the continuous adaption of a human agent to a world of stubborn
facts. Verification as the final confirmation of a proposition’s a-temporal truth value is
impossible, first of all because that would presuppose a universe dominated by consistent
principles – an ontological premise James explicitly refutes19 – and second of all because
final verification would require an objective perspective which is never given in a world
of subjective experience. Hypotheses can only be true conditionally and might eventually
be falsified.
9 The pragmatic theory of truth is anticipated as early as in James’ Principles of Psychology,
in which the idea of Humean atomistic impressions is boldly refuted. Relations between
objects of perception and cognition are not external and to be construed according to the
laws  of  logic,  but  are  directly  apprehended.  “Let  us  use  the  words  psychic  overtone, 
suffusion, or fringe, to designate the influence of a faint brain-process upon our thought, as
it makes it aware of relations and objects but dimly perceived.”20 Connections between
sensually perceived phenomena are included and transmitted in ordinary perception,
although they are not apprehended as distinct objects. The classical, Thomistic theory of
truth, which is built on the idea of an isomorphic representation of things in the mind, is
unable to explain our awareness of  the relatedness of  events and objects.  Instead of
mirroring  isolated  sense-data,  concepts  are  “purely  teleological  weapons  of  the  mind.”21
Pragmatism elaborates on this specific teleology of concepts, and while in the Principles 
the external, or rather experiential, world is regarded as delivering relations in the form
of diffuse sensations, James’ later writings focus on the converse relationship. “To ‘agree’
in the widest sense with a reality, can only mean to be guided either straight up to it or into its
surroundings, or to be put into such working touch with it as to handle either it or something
From Consistency to Coherence
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, III-1 | 2011
4
connected with it better than if we disagreed.”22 If truth cannot consist in an exact copy of
reality, true ideas or beliefs are characterized by their teleological content, which allow
for a successful orientation among experiential relations, i.e. orientation in the empirical
world. Truth is not a property inherent in specific ideas and independent of being tested
against the world of stubborn facts and which beliefs may count as true beliefs turns out
in the process of their application. Truth thus becomes an experiential concept that is
subject to empirical, though by no means positivistic, testing.
10 However,  apart  from  the  empirical  dimension  usually  associated  with  a  pragmatist
conception  of  truth,  the  Jamesian  approach  comprises  a  rational  dimension  that  is
introduced  under  the  heading  of  consistency.  It  is not  only  the  establishment  of  a
successful relation to the experiential world that is satisfactory, but also the agreement
between newly found ideas, propositions, theories with those already accepted as true.
“Above all, we find consistency satisfactory, consistency between the present idea and
the rest of our mental equipment, including the whole order of our sensations, and that
of our intuitions of likeness and difference, and our whole stock of previously acquired
truths.”23 The demand that new theories be consistent with older ones is probably the
decisive rational criterion in James’ pragmatist conception of truth, although it is hardly
ever appreciated in its full significance. Consistency ensures unity of experience in the
face of an inescapable epistemic pluralism that results from the fact that concepts as
teleological instruments are always employed to serve individual interests.
11 This subjective dimension of the Jamesian theory of truth can be characterised as a form
of epistemic conservatism that can neither be classed among the foundationalist theories
of knowledge nor among those generally referred to as coherence theories. Epistemic
conservatism does by no means denote a unified position or clearly defined concept, but
has come to stand for a variety of different epistemological theories.24 In its most naïve
formulation it states that “the fact that a person believes a proposition [is] at least a
prima facie epistemic reason in support of the proposition believed.”25 It would take us
too far to enlarge on the intricacies of the current debate concerning the epistemic value
of internal states. It will suffice at this point to bear in mind that all versions of epistemic
conservatism share the assumption that the fact that an agent holds a certain belief plays
a major  role  in  the agent  being justified in having this  belief.  James’  argument,  if  I
understand him correctly, functions on three different levels, namely on a psychological,
an ontological and a pragmatic one.
12 In matters of belief, James states, “we are all extreme conservatives.”26 This is what I will
call  his  psychological  argument  for  epistemic  conservatism.  James’s  version  of
pragmatism, in contrast to Peirce’s and even to Dewey’s, highlights the importance of the
subjective, individual genesis of truths. With regard to their beliefs, people just find it
enormously difficult to give up deeply rooted convictions, and concepts that have stood
the test of applicability function as a criterion for the evaluation of novel ideas. Percepts,
concepts  and theories  alike are  affected and need to find a  place within a  coherent
scheme, before they can be accepted as true. A prominent example for the demand for
this  form  of  consistency  is  the  discovery  of  radium,  whose  radiation  and  energy
production  seemed  to  contradict  the  law  of  the  conservation  of  energy,  until
measurement  and  law  of  nature  were  “re-married”  through  the  concept  of  self-
transforming  atomic  nuclei;  a  process  in  scientific  activity  that  was  to  repeat  itself
decades later in the postulation of anti-neutrinos to explain the energy balance of beta
radiation.
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13 Consistency is not a criterion that counts from the very beginning and restricts the field
of possible discoveries and experiences, but is a psychological demand that bears post-
ponement. As long as a belief is constitutive for its own verification, such as the belief in
my ability to jump across an abyss, it would be irrational to abandon my belief ex ante,
just because it is not consistent with other beliefs. It is only in moments of reflection that
potential contradictions within the field of my beliefs show and result in an “inward
trouble.”27 This  is  particularly  significant  with  regard  to  religious  phenomena  as
discussed in The Will to Believe and the Varieties of Religious Experience: We are justified in
considering a proposition to be true for subjective reasons, if a decision is existential and
cannot be put off. But even if such a belief is prima facie justified, its cognitive content
must allow a comparison with other beliefs – after all the crucial point for James in that
respect is that the acceptance of a hypothesis on pragmatic, external grounds enables us
to  achieve  the  particular  evidence  required.  Its  truth value  is  a  relative  one,  whose
particular use earns it an advance of trust, which, however, must maintain itself at least
in the rational process of making our ideas cohere. “New truth is always a smoother-over
of transitions. It marries old opinion to new fact so as ever to show a minimum of jolt, a
maximum of continuity.”28 Ultimately the subjective starting point decides which truths
make up the core of beliefs. As new experiences have to stand the test against the organic
whole of individually accepted beliefs, impressive religious experiences made early in the
personal  biography will  in  most  cases  result  in  a  more are  less  religious  worldview.
Complete consistency is a limit-concept,  which is in effect never achieved, but which
guides the formulation of comprehensive theories.
14 The second dimension of James’ epistemic conservatism is not, like the psychological one,
restricted to saying that we actually are conservative when it comes to modifying existing
beliefs, but holds that consistency with what we already believe is a necessary condition
for a belief to be acceptable as true. Genealogical consistency of beliefs systematically
corresponds to the coherence of the individual components of our body of theoretical
knowledge, and apart from the psychological thesis, James advocates a specific form of
coherentism.29 Epistemic  externalists  arguing  against  epistemic  conservatism  or
coherentism  usually  pose  the  question,  why  the  fact  that  different  beliefs  do  not
contradict one another should be a criterion for the truth of each of the individual beliefs.
James’s answer refers back to his experiential ontology. From a radically empiricist point
of  view the stock of  previously  acquired truths  is  itself  part  of  experience,  which a
pragmatically  interpreted  correspondence  theory  of  truth  must  take  into  account.
Intellectual satisfactions are “all mere matters of consistency – and emphatically not of
consistency between an absolute reality and the mind’s copies of  it,  but actually felt
consistency  among  judgments,  objects,  and  habits  of  reacting,  in  the  mind’s  own
experienceable  world.”30 If  reality  can only  be  described  as  experience,  and our  old
beliefs, our commonsense, and even our language form part of the stream of experience
there is no alternative to considering all beliefs as necessary criterion to judge whether a
belief is true or false. At the same time it is clear that James epistemic conservatism does
not issue in a holistic coherentism, but in a conception that allows for a gradation of a
pluralism of  truths.  The  more  satisfactory  relations  between different  experiences  a
hypothesis generates, i.e. the greater the sum of satisfactions it produces, the ‘truer’ it is.
31
15 The third dimension of James’ epistemic conservatism is based on a purely pragmatic
argument. To a certain extent it runs vertically to the epistemological argument of a
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coherence  theory  of  truth,  because  it  prima  facie  allows  for  individual,  isolated
propositions or ideas to be true. The function of “satisfactory working or leading”32 in
James  is  a  conjunctive  criterion  for  truth,  in  which  objectivity  and  subjectivity  are
synthesized  to  constitute  truth  relations  in  the  framework  of  our  experience.  But
methodologically  James  clearly  differentiates  between  the  psychological  and  the
empirical aspect: “We live in a world of realities that can be infinitely harmful. Ideas that
tell  us  which  of  them  to  expect  count  as  true  ideas  in  all  this  primary  sphere  of
verification, and the pursuit of such ideas is a primary human duty.”33 The endeavour to
achieve consistency between the individual propositions is secondary to the genesis of
empirically successful concepts. It is only when a notion or a concept has proven its cash-
value that the necessity arises to demand consistency. This differentiation is entirely in
accordance with James’s emphasis on the inertia of existing truths: A novel idea, which
contradicts  established  concepts,  will  only  gradually  become  accepted  and  will  be
considerably modified in the course of its integration. As long as the hitherto isolated
proposition is  not  successfully  applicable  to  the  experienced reality,  the  criterion of
consistency is prima facie insignificant. Such a purely instrumental conception of truth,
however, would face the problem of admitting discontinuous theories which approach
different fields of experience by means of different concepts, thus undermining James’s
intention of  equally  doing justice  to  science,  religion and morality.  The danger  of  a
separation of theories, each of which might be successful in its own subject area, might
issue into a competitive struggle for supremacy, which in the twentieth century almost
seemed to have been won by the causal explanations of the natural sciences. Principally,
as even Rorty acknowledges, “scientific inquiry is best viewed as the attempt to find a
single,  unified,  coherent description of the world.”34 While Rorty attempts to exclude
religious  experience  from  a  unified  philosophical  theory  in  order  to  privatize  and
depoliticize it, James aims at the inclusion of all the diverse dimensions of experience.
Consistency is necessary, because only when no field of experience is privileged can we
ensure  that  the  possible  scope  of  novel  experience  does  not  become  limited  and
restricted.
16 It is on the basis of this conception that James’ pragmatism can be defended against the
common charges leveled most prominently by Bertrand Russell and, more recently, by
Nicholas  Rescher,  according  to  whom  the  Jamesian  focus  on  affective,  subjective
satisfaction brings with it  the danger of  their “disassembling into a virtually endless
proliferation  of  purposive  contextualizations.”35 It  is  often  neglected  that
intersubjectivity does play a significant role in James’ philosophy. Already in the Varieties 
does  he point  to  the fact  that  a  religious  belief  –  as  well  as  a  scientific  theory –  is
philosophically unsatisfactory, if it excludes a large part of our experience. God or the
divine is experienced individually, but it is experienced as something that has objective
reality and is related to the rest of the universe. A purely private God is not a God we
want to believe in. Rorty’s argument that at least religiously inspired belief is immune
from confirmation and coherence, because it is not subject to intersubjective standards,36
neglects the fact that relevant beliefs are always susceptible to rational critique. As an
intellectually sincere person I cannot avoid accepting the criteria of rationality of my
fellows to such a degree that a merely privately held hope for a transcendent power will
in most cases not pass the comparison with other beliefs. “[T]he greatest enemy of any of
our truths may be the rest of our truths,”37 and one of the truths consists in accepting
divergent beliefs in other individuals as one experience in our own coherent system of
beliefs. As implied in the notion of the cash-value,38 the satisfactoriness of truth oscillates
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between individual and public as much as money is only valuable in a social setting. Each
individual’s experience, like its ideals or moral convictions, always represents a partial
segment of the totality of experience. At least as philosophers, who are aware of the fact
that their experience might not be historically and culturally representative, we need to
“throw in our own spontaneous ideals, even the dearest, impartially in with that total
mass of ideas which are fairly to be judged.”39 Rationality might not mandate that we
have our beliefs tested by others, but we do at least need to consider alternative beliefs
and integrate  the  fact  that  these  other,  potentially  conflicting  beliefs  exist  into  our
personal coherent scheme. Intersubjectivity is not a prioritized criterion in James, but
starting from the idea of consistency it is obvious that intersubjectivity enters into each
subjectively structured totality of experience.
 
IV. Whitehead’s Transformation of James’ Theory of
Truth
17 James’s approach to truth anticipates a methodological  enterprise that finds its most
concise formulation in the philosophy of Alfred N. Whitehead, the pragmatic character of
which  has  escaped  the  attention  of  critics.  At  the  beginning  of  Process  and  Reality
Whitehead outlines  the task and the method of  his  so-called speculative philosophy.
“Speculative Philosophy is the endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system
of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted. By
this  notion of  ‘interpretation’  I  mean that  everything of  which we are conscious,  as
enjoyed, perceived, willed, or thought, shall have the character of a particular instance of
the  general  scheme.”40 The  idea  of  the  necessity  of  a  cosmological  scheme  is  then
elaborated  on  as  meaning  the  applicability  and  adequacy  of  the  basic  metaphysical
concepts. A notion is applicable if there is at least one item of experience which is thus
interpretable, and it is adequate, if the entire texture of human experience is capable of
such  interpretation.  Both  aspects  taken  together  form  the  “empirical  side”41 of
Whitehead’s  speculative philosophy,  while  logic  and coherence constitute its  rational
side.  Translated  into  Jamesian  terms,  the  applicability  of  a  concept  consists  in  its
experiential satisfactoriness. The pragmatic methodology underlying Whitehead’s project
of  devising  a  philosophical  cosmology  starts  from  a  level  different  from  sensory
perception and individual experience, as metaphysics is based on the data of the sciences
and civilized experience as manifest  in language,  conduct,  literature and art.  In that
sense, it is first of all the individual sciences that proceed pragmatically by developing
notions  and  experimentally  testing  their  working  value.42 Metaphysics  then  is
pragmatism functioning of the level of the philosophy of science, with the purpose of
revising the sciences’ terminological and methodological presuppositions. The function of
coordinating the sciences is guided by the hope that their results might eventually result
in one all-encompassing system. Accordingly, metaphysics means a systematic account of
everything that can be experienced and thought about on the basis of the coordinated
assumption of every other theoretic inquiry.43 “Whatever is found in ‘practice’ must lie
within the scope of  the metaphysical  description”44 and the “pragmatic  test” 45 to  be
passed by a philosophical  cosmology is  whether every instance of  experience can be
interpreted by recourse to its notions.
18 At a first glance the concept of adequacy seems to contain and make redundant that of
applicability. The distinction between a sufficient and a necessary condition, however,
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does not simply reflect the cosmological system aimed at, but the mode of procedure.46
The metaphysical enquiry starts by interpreting one specific field of human experience in
order to ensure the applicability of the abstract scheme thus gained. It then gradually
proceeds  by searching for  principles  of  higher  generality  until  it  finally  results  in  a
universally applicable theory. Such a comprehensive, all-embracing scheme cannot be
arrived at by inductive inference, but relies on abductive reasoning, which Whitehead
terms  philosophic  generalization.  “In  this  description  of  philosophic  method,  the term
philosophic generalisation’ has meant ‘the utilization of specific notions, applying to a
restricted group of facts,  for the divination of the generic notions which apply to all
facts’.”47
19 Whitehead is not entirely clear about the status of the final, adequate cosmology. Do we
necessarily  arrive  at  one  single  generalization,  no  matter  if  we  choose  psychology,
religion, aesthetics or physics as a starting point? Does the temporal, processual nature of
the universe ultimately undermine the systematic enterprise, because even the most
abstract principles are incapable of capturing a continuously changing world? While in
Process and Reality Whitehead tends to embrace the melioristic idea that progress in the
formulation of ultimate generalities is possible,  his later works suggest a much more
careful optimism, re-verberating in the famous concluding remarks of his last lecture,
namely  that  “exactness  is  a  fake.”48 Although  the  topic  is  worth  some  detailed
elaboration, for my present purpose it suffices to regard adequacy as a regulative ideal,
which is to guard us against the different versions of biologism, physicalism or idealism,
where the actual level of generality of the basic notions is overestimated.
20 One of the cornerstones of Whitehead’s version of pragmatism is his interpretation of
William James’s epistemic conservatism, which is developed as one part of the rational
side of his speculative philosophy. Here, the criterion of logic primarily refers to basic
logical ideas, such as the law of non-contradiction and the principles of inference, while
coherence, as in James, demands that the fundamental concepts not be isolated. Ignoring
the psychological dimension of James’ theory of truth, Whitehead particularly focuses on
its epistemological and pragmatic aspect.
21 Whitehead defines coherence as meaning that “the fundamental ideas, in terms of which
the  scheme  is  developed,  presuppose  each  other,  so  that  in  isolation  they  are
meaningless.”49 Other than in James, coherence is not primarily a subjective criterion that
refers to a, not necessarily verbal, feeling that things fit, but is grounded in language.
Coherence means a basic inventory of concepts whose fundamental notions form a non-
hierarchical  web  and  which  cannot  be  understood  in  isolation.  Each  single  term
presupposes a systematic background that assigns to it a specific meaning as part of the
system. Like in a puzzle,  where the function of each single puzzle piece can only be
deciphered in view of the complete picture, the meaning of each single notion results
from its role as part of the whole. “The notion of the complete self-sufficiency of any item
of finite knowledge is the fundamental error of dogmatism. Every such item derives its
truth, and its very meaning, from its unanalyzed relevance to the background which is
the unbounded universe.”50 What could, in the vocabulary of the late Wittgenstein, be
understood as the embeddedness in a Sprachspiel, is a never ending process aiming at the
ideal of a completely defined metaphysical system. What we encounter in Whitehead’s
holistic coherentism, in contrast to James’ epistemic conservatism, is the leapfrogging of
a continuous genesis of individual propositions which are then gradually brought into
coherence.  Although the  system lives  on  the  data  delivered  by  the  sciences,  human
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civilization and the history of philosophy, it is created as a systematic totality. Hence, by
recourse to the intersubjective stock of different experiences the system blends out their
subjective  genesis  without  denying that  experiences  do have a  history.  It  takes  into
account the experiences that have evolved over centuries and across cultures, but avoids
the danger of having a particular starting point which regulates and potentially limits the
discovery of further elements to be integrated into the coherent scheme.
22 The  reliance  on  language  in  Whitehead’s  cosmology,  however,  is  not  absolute,  and
coherence is not a purely logical-analytical criterion, but to a certain extend entails a
subjective component. On the one hand language as such is, by its very nature, under-
determined and unable to precisely capture the meaning of the fundamental notions, and
on  the  other  hand  the  relevant  systematic  background  depends  of  the  significance
ascribed to it. In a philosophical cosmology, words and phrases that have their origin in
the individual sciences or everyday language are forced to stand for a generality foreign
to  their  genuine  usage  and “remain metaphors  mutely appealing  for  an imaginative
leap.”51 Semantics may help us to avoid contradictoriness in our terminology, but the
exact  meaning  of  each  notion  in  the  specific  context  itself  cannot  be  adequately
expressed in words.
23 The  epistemic  holism  advanced  by  Whitehead  also  draws  heavily  on  the  pragmatic
argument developed by James. Theoretically, a complete cosmology might explain all but
one fact of human experience on the basis of its fundamental notions. This is precisely
the case in what Whitehead identifies as a bifurcation of nature: Although the sciences have
successfully managed to explain natural phenomena, their basic theoretical conceptions
have turned out to be unable to do justice to human feelings and intentions. Instead of
revising their theories, however, the sciences have tried to explain them away by either
completely  ignoring  them  or  by  regarding  them  as  epiphenomena,  making  mutual
critique among the sciences and commonsense impossible. Unless these notions form an
integral part of the general scheme, however, it lacks coherence. The interdependency of
the foundational theoretical notions is to prevent us from simply adding something to the
scheme in order to explain an exception not covered by the scheme as such. The result is
a metaphysical scheme that can account for all aspects of experience by fusing them into
a coherent system.
 
V. Religious Experience in James and Whitehead
24 The  different  ideas  of  consistency  and  coherence  in  James  and  Whitehead  do  have
practical  consequences  that  can  best  be  shown  by  reference  to  the  phenomenon  of
religious experience. Among the factors relevant for the genesis of new experience in
James’ pragmatist thinking are not only empirical data, but also desires and emotions.52
Such emotions could, for example, appear in the form of religious doubts which may well
influence an entire worldview. The starting point chosen for a coherent philosophy is
thus essential for the resulting theory. “What we usually do is first to frame some system
of concepts mentally classified, serialized, or connected in some intellectual way, and
then to  use  this  as  a  tally  by  which  we  ‘keep  tab’  on  the  impressions  that  present
themselves.”53 As experiments occur successively and later theory formations take place
in  line  with  earlier  ones,  potential  differences  between  individual  sciences  tend  to
become more pronounced in the course of time. The same holds true for the different
fields of experience in individual people, where scientific knowledge might contradict the
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person’s moral or religious convictions. Although philosophy aims at overcoming such
gaps, James is aware that, psychologically, conservatism will largely determine how far
such a gap can be bridged. Hence, he defends religious experience as one element of a
holistic philosophical perspective, but does not conceive it as mandatorily required. In
James, God’s cash-value is put on trial by our previously accepted truths, but vice versa
presents a challenge for scientific findings: “The truth of ‘God’ has to run the gauntlet of
all our other truths. It is on trial by them and they on trial by it.”54 For him, experiences
are primarily individual and for those who have never had religious experience, there is
no reason to integrate the hypothesis of  God into the web of  their truths.  From the
perspective of a religious person such a view might be deficient, but it fulfils the criteria
of coherence and non-contradiction.
25 Whitehead, in contrast to James’ focus on the genealogy of truths, demands that every
single element of the entire texture of human experience be made a part of a coherent
philosophical cosmology. Whitehead goes beyond James, although he sides him against
Peirce’s restrictive focus on the logic of science. His focus is on the “texture”55 of human
experience in the sense of a cosmology which is not only coherent, but also adequate. The
consequence is that the existence of religious experience as such must be counted among
the integral aspects of a complete description of reality.  As long as there are human
beings who have religious experience it needs to be included in a coherent cosmology.
Owing  to  a  systematic  approach  that  takes  up  Jamesian  individual  experience  and
transforms it into an objective datum, Whitehead’s version of pragmatism is better suited
than James’s to arrive at what James himself considers to be an essential requirement of
philosophy: “Philosophy must, in any case, complete the sciences, and must incorporate
their methods. One cannot see why, if such a policy should appear advisable, philosophy
might not end by foreswearing all dogmatism whatever, and become as hypothetical in
her manners as the most empirical science of them all.”56 If “sciences” does not only refer
to the natural sciences, but also the humanities, thus comprising every element of human
experience, a philosophical cosmology needs to take account of all phenomena. It must
not be left to the individual genesis of beliefs, nor must it be left to the fundamental
assumptions that have evolved within a specific cultural environment. A philosophy that
truly wants to mediate between religion, morality and the natural sciences will naturally
develop into the holistic coherentism anticipated by James and advanced by Whitehead.
 
VI. Epilogue
26 The development and transformation outlined above sheds light on the continuity of the
pragmatist  tradition.  In  the  second  half  of  the  twentieth  century,  a  number  of
philosophers have contributed to a revival of pragmatist thinking, the most significant
and influential among them certainly being Willard van Orman Quine. In 1930, fascinated
by the Principia Mathematica, Quine became a student of Whitehead, who also supervised
his dissertation on The Logic of Sequences: A Generalization of Principia Mathematica. Not only
does  Quine  inherit  James’  and  Whitehead’s  project  of  refuting  and  overcoming  “the
supposed  boundary  between  speculative  metaphysics  and  natural  science.”57 He  also
develops a holistic theory of truth closely related to the pragmatist programme of his
predecessors. In repudiating the boundary between analytic and synthetic frameworks
Quine  approaches  a  holistic  pragmatism  that  is  obviously  in  line  with  James  and
Whitehead. “Each man is given a scientific heritage plus a continuing barrage of sensory
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stimulation; and the considerations which guide him in warping his scientific heritage to
fit his continuing sensory promptings are, where rational, pragmatic.”58 Novel findings
are integrated into a scheme or theory based on a scientific heritage that we can imagine
as being culturally and historically contingent. Whenever the sensory input delivers data
inconsistent with the stock of previously acquired hypotheses, the heritage is warped, i.e.
modified to better suit the data generated in the ongoing process of discovery. While, as
in James,  the individual  is  the epistemologically  conservative element  that  owns the
scientific  heritage,  the  established  conceptualizations  are  products  of  the  social
endeavour of science.
27 Equally  indebted  to  the  pragmatist  approach  sketched  above  is  C. I. Lewis  in  his
endeavour to test the acceptability of propositions in the framework of formal systems.
While  there  can  be  different  alternative  formal  frameworks  that  are  all  valuable
instruments  for  reasoning,  the  best  system,  relative  and  absolute,  proves  itself  on
pragmatic grounds. A particular logical system is the appropriate instrument with regard
to a certain range of application. The pragmatically most effective formal system is the
one that entails the widest range of purposes, i.e. the system which allows for a formal
verification of the widest scope of different propositions.59 Despite the narrow focus on
logic and mathematics, Lewis shows that coherentism can be translated into a formally
analyzable methodology in which propositions are verified within a formal system, while
the system itself is tested against experience.
28 The  list  of  pragmatists  continuing  the  epistemological  strand  of  pragmatism  may
certainly be extended to include such thinkers as Hilary Putnam, Juergen Habermas and
Robert  Brandom.  What  is  most  important,  however,  is  that  an  analysis  of  the
transformation  of  one  aspect  of  pragmatist  philosophy,  namely  its  theory  of  truth,
challenges the commonly accepted genealogy of pragmatism. The usual assumption is
that pragmatism, anticipated by Ralph Waldo Emerson and American transcendentalism,
was developed around the turn of the century by Peirce, James, Dewey and some of their
disciples. It then fell into oblivion for a time of almost forty years, leaving a gap that,
according to some interpreters,  is even highlighted by the fact that none of the new
pragmatists  have  devoted  much  time  to  a  close  examination  of  classical  pragmatist
positions.60 Basically every work on the genealogy of  pragmatism either implicitly or
explicitly states that it was only after this gap that pragmatism was rediscovered and
built  upon by scholars as different as Willard V. O. Quine,  Stanley Cavell  and Richard
Rorty.  There can, of course,  be no doubt as to counting all  these authors among the
pragmatists, although Quine himself did time and again appear to have turned against
pragmatism. We should be aware of that fact, however, that there has never been a real
temporal gap between classical pragmatism and contemporary neo-pragmatism. There
was a continuous development from James to Quine and others through the philosophy of
Whitehead, who left a form of pragmatism which on the one hand is closely related to
James’ thought and which on the other hand develops it into a philosophical theory much
easier  to  approach from an analytic  point  of  view.  The  attempt  at  turning  classical
pragmatism  into  a  comprehensive  theory  which  satisfies  the  demand  for  logical
consistency  has  a  long  history  that  can  be  traced  back  to  its  very  beginning.  With
Whitehead as the ‘missing link,’ the pragmatist tradition appears to have taken a rather
linear  development,  while  at  the  same  time  a  Whiteheadian  perspective  on  James’
philosophy helps to shed light on some of the neglected and often underestimated details
of his pragmatism.
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ABSTRACTS
The  significance  of  A. N. Whitehead’s  contribution  to  20th  century  metaphysics  has  become
widely recognized. The focus on the novelty of his process ontology, however, has led to a view
that isolates him from the mainstream of the tradition of Western philosophy. Hence, it is often
overlooked that on the methodological  level  Whitehead is  a  pragmatist,  whose much quoted
indebtedness  to  William  James  is  reflected  in  the  project  of  his  speculative  metaphysics.  A
detailed analysis  of  the respective  theories  of  truth and knowledge in James and Whitehead
illustrates  their  common  methodological  approach  and  allows  us  to  assess  the  role  of
Whiteheadian  thinking  within  the  pragmatist  tradition.  James  advances  a  form of  epistemic
conservatism that supplements the pragmatic idea of a concept’s cash-value with the demand for
internal consistency. New beliefs have to fit in the totality of all previously accepted convictions
in order to become accepted as true. James argues his case on three levels – a psychological, an
epistemological  and  a  pragmatic  one  –  and  develops  a  theory  of  truth  that  comprises  an
empirical and a rational dimension. Whitehead takes up this two-sided approach, but modifies
the idea of genetic consistency into that of systematic coherence. The fundamental concepts of
an ontological theory must not be isolated from each other to allow for a cosmology which is
both rational and satisfies the pragmatic test of applicability. With the close relation of James
and Whitehead in mind, the latter can be identified as the ‘missing link’ that bridges the gap
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